VIEWING FEDERAL JURISDICTION THROUGH
THE LOOKING GLASS OF BANKRUPTCY
John T. Cross*
The study of federal jurisdiction' is in many ways a study of
unrealized possibilities. Even though there have been federal
courts in the United States for over 200 years, many of the great
"what ifs" posed by scholars in the field simply have never occurred. Congress and the federal courts have generally been
careful not to stray too far from the roles that the Constitution
envisions for them. As a result, discussion of issues such as Congress's ability to deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over
suits challenging abortion laws has been confined to the law journals instead of the case reports.
Of course, issues of federal jurisdiction do arise in the courts
on a fairly regular basis.2 Yet even with these cases the study of
federal jurisdiction is difficult. The problem arises when one attempts to synthesize the reported cases on the subject. Federal
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville School of Law, Louisville,
KY. B.S., Bradley University, 1981; J.D., University of Illinois, 1984.
1 The definition of "federal jurisdiction" in this article is not limited to the
power of the federal courts to decide cases. This article will instead use the term to
refer to the ever-evolving jurisprudence dealing with the relations among the federal courts, the other branches of the federal government and the states.
2 For example, there has been a flurry of cases in recent years construing the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, one of the cornerstones of United States
federalism. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak and Circle Village, Ill
S. Ct. 2578 (1991) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity
provision prohibits both sovereigns, including Indian tribes, as well as individuals,
from suing states); Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990)
(holding that a state waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court only if
the Supreme Court, after applying a strict standard, finds waiver upon express language or overwhelming implication); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989) (finding that, in enacting 11 U.S.C. § 106(c), Congress did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity); Missouri v.Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (concluding that the Eleventh Amendment
applies neither to an attorney's fee award that is ancillary to a grant of prospective
relief, against a state, nor to the calculation of the fee's amount); Dellmuth v. Muth,
491 U.S. 223 (1989) (determining that Congress, in enacting the Education of the
Handicapped Act, never intended to abrogate state immunity from suit); Will v.
Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding that, unless a state
provides for the contrary, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against states
for civil rights deprivations); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)
(finding that Eleventh Amendment does not preclude Congress from enacting,
through the Commerce Clause, a statute providing for federal suits against states
for money damages).
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jurisdiction in the United States spans a wide variety of matters.
Although Congress has never allowed the federal courts to exercise all of the Article III judicial power,' it has nevertheless given
the federal courts a major role in the enforcement of many rights.
Federal jurisdiction extends to matters both civil and criminal.
In the civil realm, it extends to matters ranging from "garden
variety" tort and contract claims to complex issues of antitrust
and patent law. Because the same federal jurisdiction issues may
arise in any of these cases,4 distilling the wide variety of cases
into a "rule of law" can be difficult.
This Article's primary purpose is to suggest a uniform way to
approach federal jurisdiction. Specifically, this Article demonstrates that bankruptcy can serve as a useful paradigm from
which to analyze many of the basic issues that arise. Because of
its unique nature, bankruptcy in the United States offers working
examples of a number of the "what ifs" that have intrigued scholars over the years. Examining these issues from the single bankruptcy vantage point allows one to avoid the inconvenience of
having to compare and distinguish cases decided under a wide
variety of governing laws.
There is another feature of bankruptcy that makes it particularly useful as a tool for studying federal jurisdiction. From the
perspective of federalism, bankruptcy is somewhat "neutral."
Although the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power
to enact bankruptcy laws, 5 the federal interest in bankruptcy is
not one of overriding importance. The notion of an overriding
federal interest is, of course, often invoked by the United States
Supreme Court when giving the federal government plenary
power to act. 6
3 For example, although Article III allows the Supreme Court to hear appeals
of diversity cases adjudicated in the state courts, Congress has never extended the
Court's jurisdiction to such cases.
4 Compare, for example, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), and Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973), in
which the Court analyzed the same basic issue - the power of Congress to assign
adjudication to tribunals not subject to the protections of Article III - in a civil and
criminal proceeding, respectively.
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
6 The Court has, for example, often found such an overriding federal interest
in the regulation of aliens and naturalization. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787
(1977). The Fiallo Court stated that " 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens". Id. at
792 (quoting from Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
See also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (holding that a Civil Service Commission regulation barring noncitizens, including resident aliens, from
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As with any model, using bankruptcy as a focal point has its
shortcomings. Indeed, the very fact that bankruptcy is in a sense
"neutral" means that some of the conclusions that one obtains
may be inapposite in areas that do involve an overriding federal
concern. Yet, this fact should not condemn the process. Far
from suggesting that all of federal jurisdiction's difficult issues
can be resolved simply by approaching them from the perspective of bankruptcy, this Article advocates the use of bankruptcy
merely as a shorthand way of analyzing these jurisdictional
problems. Extending any conclusions that one draws to individual non-bankruptcy situations must take into account the factors
unique to those situations.
I.

THE NATURE OF BANKRUPTCY IN THE UNITED STATES

Most people -

lawyers and non-lawyers alike

-

view bank-

ruptcy as a scheme of economic relief designed to relieve debtors
of an excessive financial burden. This view, however, overlooks
the genesis of bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law evolved from the
English bankruptcy legislation, which in turn traces its roots to
the Italian law-merchant. 7 Historically, bankruptcy was a creditor's
remedy that allowed creditors to have a court seize the assets of a
recalcitrant debtor and apply them to the payment of that
debtor's debts. Because it focused on ensuring that creditors
were paid, early bankruptcy legislation did not afford the debtor
a discharge; a fundamental component in modern bankruptcy
law. Indeed, the notion of a discharge came not from English
bankruptcy law, but instead from certain common law actions that
employment in the federal civil service violative of the Fifth Amendment because it
deprived the resident aliens of liberty without due process; the Commission's assertion of an overriding national interest to justify its citizenship requirement for federal service must include a valid reason for assuming that the requirement was
intended to serve that national interest); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972) (holding that if the Attorney General decides, for a legitimate reason, not to
waive provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to allow entry of
aliens, the courts will not disturb that decision); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (holding that the United States Attorney General's
exclusion of a resident alien from reentry into the country, due to national security
concerns, was not unlawful); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609
(1889) ("The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign
powers delegated by the government... cannot be granted away or restarined on
behalf of any one.").
7 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

PART I, H.R. Doc. No. 137, part 1, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 61, at 63 (1973) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT].
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a debtor could initiate based upon insolvency. 8 Modern bankruptcy represents a merger of these historically separate bodies
of law.
Viewed in this historic light, bankruptcy is primarily a process
by which a court marshals all of the debtor's assets and applies
those assets to the payment of that debtor's debts.9 Legal disputes inevitably arise during this process of collection and distribution. There may be some dispute as to what assets are owned
by the debtor. In addition, the court must determine whether
each of the creditors claiming a right to payment has a valid
claim. The bankruptcy process, then, involves more than mere
ministerial acts. It is also necessary to resolve a number of legal
disputes that have an impact on the debtor's estate.
This observation leads directly to the first feature of bankruptcy that makes it especially useful in analyzing issues of federalism. A bankruptcy court' adjudicating these underlying issues
of law will generally apply state law as the substantive rule of decision. Although a bankruptcy petition may affect the amount a
creditor may receive from the debtor on a claim, it usually does
not affect the claim's legal validity. 1 Rather, most issues affecting the validity of a claim are resolved by the same state law that
would apply outside of bankruptcy. Therefore, bankruptcy
courts will normally apply the applicable state law to protect the
12
litigants' expectations.
8 Id. Unlike the action in bankruptcy, which required a showing that the debtor
was purposefully avoiding his creditors, these "insolvency laws" required that the
debtor demonstrate some inability to pay his debts. Id. The insolvency laws still
exist in limited form in certain state insolvency actions.
9 This statement is, of course, an oversimplification. First, the debtor need not
always give up all of her assets. In bankruptcy cases involving non-corporate debtors, for example, the debtor may retain certain exempt assets. 11 U.S.C. § 522
(1988). In addition, not all creditors will necessarily share in the distribution. See
11 U.S.C. § 502 (1979) (preventing certain creditors from filing a claim for payment against the estate).
10 Two separate types of federal courts are regularly involved in bankruptcy
cases. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. This article will use the term
"Bankruptcy Courts" to refer to the specialized non-Article III courts that Congress established to administer bankruptcy cases. The non-capitalized term "bankruptcy court," alternatively, will be used generically to refer to any federal court
exercising bankruptcy jurisdiction.
It See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (1988) (preventing a creditor with a claim that "is
unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement
or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured" from recovering in bankruptcy).
On the other hand, bankruptcy does not allow certain claims that may be perfectly valid under state law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(3), (4) (1988).
12 For a general discussion of these principles, see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
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Even this feature, however, does not state the entire story.
Federal bankruptcy is more than interpleader coupled with a discharge. The Bankruptcy Code 13 also contains a number of provisions that change or add to the body of non-bankruptcy
substantive law. In some situations, the Bankruptcy Code adds
claims against the estate. 14 Additionally, however, the Code occasionally alters the legal rules governing the debtor's pre-bankruptcy debts. The trustee's avoidance powers are the most
obvious example. These provisions allow the bankruptcy trustee
to bring an action to nullify certain transactions and conveyances
that the debtor and her creditors entered into prior to bankruptcy. 15 Thesefederal causes of action give the trustee the power
to deal with parties who, anticipating an impending bankruptcy
proceeding, attempt to structure their affairs so as to increase
their share of the bankruptcy distribution. For purposes of federal jurisdiction, then, bankruptcy involves a complicated blend
of state and federal law claims.
With these general principles in mind, we may now turn to a
number of more specific characteristics of bankruptcy that make
it a microcosm of the world of federal jurisdiction. One caveat,
however, is in order. The following discussion assumes that the
reader has a basic knowledge of both the bankruptcy laws and the
basic issues that arise in the area of federal jurisdiction. The uninitiated can 6 turn to a number of sources for the necessary
background.'

Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982); Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329
U.S. 156, 171 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 833 (1947);
2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.2 (1965); John
T. Cross, State Choice of Law Rules in Bankruptcy, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 531, 535-38
(1989); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1035
(1953).
'3 Pub. L. No. 95-595, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011329 (1988)). The original 1978 legislation has been amended several times. This
Article will refer to the 1978 legislation, as amended, as the "Bankruptcy Code."
14 Most of these claims relate to the estate's administration. For example, 11
U.S.C. § 542 (1988) allows the trustee to commence an action to compel someone
in possession of property of the estate to turn that property over to the trustee.

15 The primary avoidance powers are the "strong arm" clause (11 U.S.C.
§ 544(a) (1988)), the fraudulent conveyance provisions (11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b) & 548
(1988)), the statutory lien provision (11 U.S.C. § 545 (1988)), and the preference
provision (11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988)).
16 Probably the best single volume sources in each area are ERWIN CHEMERINand BENJA-

SKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1989 & 1990 Supp.) for federal jurisdiction,
MIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL (Revised

ed. 1986 &
1990 Cumulative Supp.) for bankruptcy. Other valuable sources are, for federal
jurisdiction: CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
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ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE UNIQUE NATURE OF BANKRUPTCY

As the above discussion suggests, bankruptcy involves many
of the federal jurisdiction issues that courts and commentators
have struggled with over the years. This section of the Article
will identify the major issues that arise and discuss the extent to
which the law pertaining to certain facets of bankruptcy can be
analogized to other areas of federal practice. For ease of reference, the Article attempts to arrange the myriad issues into logical categories - a frustrating task given the extent to which
issues of federal jurisdiction overlap and interrelate.
A.

Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts

Perhaps the most fundamental questions in federal jurisdiction jurisprudence deal with the scope of jurisdiction that can be
exercised by the federal courts. This concern is certainly valid,
for a court's jurisdiction is directly proportionate to the influence
that the court can wield on society. Congress has vested the federal courts in bankruptcy with broad personal and subject matter
jurisdiction. At times, this jurisdiction approaches the constitutionally-established limits on federal judicial activity. In addition,
Congress has enacted provisions that require federal courts to
abstain from hearing state law cases, notwithstanding their relationship to the bankruptcy case. Each of these aspects of federal
jurisdiction will be discussed in turn.
1.

Personal Jurisdiction

In most civil cases, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction
over the parties only to the extent that a state court in that forum
could do so.' 7 In a few cases, however, Congress has expanded
this jurisdiction.' 8 Bankruptcy is one of these special areas.
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d)' 9 allows litigants in Bankruptcy Courts
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

(2d ed. 1984);

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE LAW
P. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS (4th ed.
1990); PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL M. MELTZER, PAULJ. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988);
and, for bankruptcy: WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed.
OF FEDERAL COURTS

(4th ed. 1983);

DAVID

1979).
17 See generally Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97
(1987). The reasons for, and implications of, this principle are discussed infra at
note 24 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1988) (allowing parties to a federal statutory interpleader action to serve process anywhere within the United States).
19 FED. R. BANKR. PROC. 7004(d).
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and federal district courts sitting in bankruptcy 20 to serve the
summons and complaint "anywhere in the United States." In essence, Rule 7004(d) allows federal courts in bankruptcy cases to
exercise personal jurisdiction over any defendant who can be
served with process within the United States. This nationwide
service is invaluable to a federal court attempting to adjudicate
all matters relating to a bankruptcy case.
Rule 7004(d) provides an excellent crucible for resolving the
often-debated question of whether nationwide service by the federal courts is constitutionally valid. The question can actually be
divided into two unrelated issues. First, there is the issue of
whether the Erie doctrine prevents a federal court adjudicating
state law claims from exercising jurisdiction over a defendant
who would have been immune from service in a proceeding involving the same claim in state court. 2 1 This issue is best reserved for the portion of this Article that addresses the impact of
the Erie doctrine in bankruptcy.2 2
The second issue presented by Rule 7004(d) is whether nationwide service comports with the constitutional requirement of
due process. Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed
an elaborate jurisprudence dealing with the extent to which a
state court may, consistent with due process, exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants.23 These cases were decided under
20 The differences between the Bankruptcy Courts and the federal district courts
sitting in bankruptcy will be discussed in greater depth infra at text accompanying
notes 35-42.
21 For a general discussion of this issue, see the Advisory Committee Notes to
Proposed Rule 4(k) of the 1990 Proposed Rules to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 57-72.
23 The leading decisions in this ever-growing jurisprudence are Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (finding that personal jurisdiction
and its principles of fair play and substantial justice are met where the defendant is
served while within the state); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of
California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding that, because the petitioner did not direct
its flow of commerce toward California, or establish offices, employees or agents in
the state, it did not purposely avail itself of the state's market sufficient to establish
the "substantial connection" necessary for the exercise of personal jurisdiction);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (determining a forum may
assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if that defendant has purposely availed itself of the state's benefits and privileges sufficient to establish minimum contacts); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) (finding that petitioner's acceptance of checks drawn on Texas bank, one
trip by petitioner's executive, and petitioner's purchases of helicopters and equipment from Texas manufacturer did not establish the requisite minimum contacts
for Texas courts to assert jurisdiction over the petitioner); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (holding that
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - a provision that applies on its face only to the states. Therefore, these
cases arguably do not apply to federal courts exercising jurisdiction pursuant to a federal statute or rule.2 4 The federal government, however, is also subject to a due process requirement: the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2 5 Although the
Fifth Amendment clearly applies to the federal courts, it is not
clear that it restricts those courts to the same extent that the
Fourteenth Amendment restricts the states. Strong arguments
exist on both sides. 26 It is not the purpose of this Article to resolve the debate. Rather, the purpose of this essay is to demonstrate that bankruptcy presents a working example of nationwide
service, allowing the theories to be tested in the courts.
2.

Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

As with personal jurisdiction, Congress has vested the federal courts in bankruptcy with extremely broad subject-matterjupresumption of personal jurisdiction as a discovery sanction does not violate due
process); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (reaffirming the minimum contacts standard as the
crucible by which courts determine a state's ability to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)
(introducing the minimum contacts standard as the benchmark for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant); and the venerable Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877) ("That a State can subject land within its limits belonging to nonresident owners to debts due to its own clients as it can legislate upon all other local
matters; that it can prescribe the mode and process by which it is to be reached, seems to me very plain).
24 In most cases, FED. R. CIV. PROC. 4(e) requires the federal courts to borrow
state law methods of serving the summons and complaint. FED. R. BANKR. PROC.
7004(d) supplants FED. R. Civ. PROC. 4(e) for federal courts sitting in bankruptcy.
It is also unclear, however, whether the Supreme Court cases construing the
Fourteenth Amendment even apply in those cases where the federal court is bound
by Rule 4(e) to follow state law. Some have argued that Rule 4(e) is meant to incorporate only the statutory restrictions that a state places on service, not the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN

& KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 1003 (6th ed. 1990) (federal
courts bound by Fourteenth Amendment) with JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY
KANE, & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 163-64 (1985) (federal courts bound
only by the Fifth Amendment due process provision, not the Fourteenth).
25 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26 Compare Federal Trade Comm'n v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.
KAPLAN,

1981) (employing, in a federal court case, a close adherence to the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe) with Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 203 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (stating that, unlike state court cases,
"we are not persuaded that federal service of process statutes are constrained by
constitutional due process strictures as defined by InternationalShoe . .."). See also

Fullerton, ConstitutionalLimits on Nationwide PersonalJurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79
Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1984).
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risdiction. One of Congress's main goals in drafting the current
bankruptcy laws was to give a single court the power to adjudicate all of the disputes that might arise in or in connection with a
bankruptcy case. 27 Allowing a single court to resolve all such disputes expedites the bankruptcy process by encouraging orderly
administration of a given bankruptcy case.28
The primary provision governing federal district court jurisdiction in bankruptcy is section 1334 of the Judicial Code. 29 This
section grants the district court jurisdiction over both the bankruptcy case and all administrative claims that might arise in the
process of bankruptcy.30 In addition, however, the district court
may exercise jurisdiction over all civil proceedings "related to"
the bankruptcy case. 3 1 Courts have construed this latter language as extending federal district court jurisdiction to all matters affecting the underlying bankruptcy case.3 2 A federal district
court may therefore exercise a wide degree of control over the
administration of a given debtor's bankruptcy estate.
Federal district courts, however, do not generally try bankruptcy-related matters. The Judicial Code also allows the district
court to enact a "standing order of reference," referring to that
district's Bankruptcy Court all bankruptcy cases commenced in
the district.3

3

All district courts have enacted such an order.

Therefore, a special bankruptcy judge will preside over the bankruptcy case and most of the proceedings arising in connection
27 See BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 85; H.R. REP. 95-595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-11 (1978); S. REP. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18
(1978).
28 The special bankruptcy venue provisions also reflect this goal. A federal
court with jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case will have venue over most claims
that must be litigated in connection with that case. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1992).
The only exceptions are certain de minimis consumer claims, id. at § 1409(b), and
claims arising out of the operation of the estate, id. at § 1409(d) and (e).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1992).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b) (1992). The Judicial Code refers to these proceedings as the "case under title 11" and a "civil proceeding arising under title
11," respectively.
31 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1992).
32 See, e.g., In re Dogpatch U.S.A., Inc., 810 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1987) (suit involving debtor's mortgagees, purchasers of debtor's property, and guarantors); In re
Kolinsky, 100 B.R. 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that suit to rescind contract for property sale was "otherwise related to" the debtor's case and therefore
within the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction); Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Eason, 736 F.2d 130 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction over interpleader action).
33 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1992).
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with the case.3 4
That Congress has vested the federal courts in bankruptcy
with a broad jurisdiction and has allowed such jurisdiction to be
shared between different systems raises two troubling issues in
the field of federal jurisdiction. The more notorious of the two
relates to the allocation of jurisdiction between the federal district courts and the Bankruptcy Courts. Unlike the district
courts, the Bankruptcy Courts were not created pursuant to Article III of the Constitution.3 5 Because these non-Article III courts
play an active role in the litigation of bankruptcy-related claims,
their existence directly poses the question of the extent to which
Congress can assign cases to adjudicative bodies other than Article III courts.
Indeed, the most important Supreme Court precedent on
this question comes from bankruptcy. In Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. ,36 the Supreme Court invalidated the
original jurisdictional provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act 3 7 after finding that those provisions vested too much of the
Article III judicial power in non-Article III tribunals. The current jurisdictional provisions in bankruptcy were crafted to ameliorate some of the constitutional problems identified in Northern
Pipeline.
Even after the post-Northern Pipeline amendments, the juris34 Certain matters, however, were deemed so far removed from the underlying
bankruptcy case that they must be litigated in either the federal district courts or
the state courts. First, although the Bankruptcy Court possesses jurisdiction to
hear the bankruptcy case, its jurisdiction over "related" matters is limited to "core"
proceedings. The Judicial Code sets forth a nonexclusive list of core proceedings
in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1992). Core matters are generally those closely connected to the estate's administration or distribution. Absent the parties' consent,
the Bankruptcy Court may hear non-core matters, but may only enter suggested
findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are subject to de novo review by an
Article III court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1992).
Other matters are reserved to the district courts for reasons of policy. See, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(5) (1992) (personal injury and wrongful death claims) and
157(d) (any matter that requires consideration of both the bankruptcy laws and
other federal laws regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate
commerce).
35 Article III provides that "regular" federal courts are comprised ofjudges who
are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, who
serve for life during good behavior, and who are immune from reduction in their
salaries while in office. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. In contrast, bankruptcy judges are
appointed by the United States Courts of Appeal for fourteen year terms, 28 U.S.C.
§ 152(a)(1) (1992), and have no protection against reduction in salary.
36 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
37 These provisions were contained primarily in 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (repealed
1984).
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dictional scheme in bankruptcy provides an excellent tool for
evaluating Congress's ability to assign judicial power to non-Article III courts. The amendments admittedly diminish somewhat
the role of the Bankruptcy Courts. Nevertheless, those courts
still adjudicate the bankruptcy case and most of its connected
proceedings. 3 Because the Bankruptcy Courts continue to exercise judicial functions under the new scheme, they arguably encroach on the Article III judicial power that Northern Pipeline
indicates is reserved exclusively to the Article III courts.
Of course, Northern Pipeline did not hold that non-Article III
tribunals could never perform judicial functions. First, the Court
listed three types of cases in which Congress could establish independent non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate claims of particular concern to the federal government.3 9 Second, Northern
Pipeline indicated that Congress is free to establish a non-Article
III tribunal to serve as an adjunct to an Article III court.4"
The recent amendments to the jurisdictional statutes attempt to fit the Bankruptcy Courts within these exceptions.4"
Whether they successfully do so is another question. Because
many of the claims adjudicated by a Bankruptcy Court are purely
state law claims between private parties, they can not be readily
placed in any of the three categories where the Court has allowed
Congress to use independent non-Article III tribunals. 42 In addition, the powers retained by the Bankruptcy Court go well beyond those of the typical non-Article III adjunct court. The
current jurisdictional scheme therefore continues to pose intriguing issues concerning Congress's ability to allocate the Article III
judicial power to courts of its choosing.
Another issue pertaining to subject-matter jurisdiction is less
notorious, but equally troubling. Article III of the Constitution
vests the federal judicial power in Article III courts. In addition,
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
The Court identified three different types of cases involving such a federal
interest, including: (i) courts for the territories and the District of Columbia; (ii)
courts-martial; and (iii) courts adjudicating congressionally-created "public rights."
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 63-70.
40 Id. at 77-84.
41 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333.
42 The bankruptcy courts clearly do not fall within the first two categories. In
addition, although the right to bankruptcy relief might be deemed public, the Northern Pipeline Court held that the issue before the federal courts in that case - a state
law contract claim that was loosely related to the bankruptcy case - was a private
right. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71-72.
38
39
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however, it limits that judicial power to nine discrete categories
of "cases or controversies.1 43 Matters that fall outside of these
nine categories ordinarily may not be heard in the federal
courts."" A case presenting a claim falling outside of Article III is
generally described as presenting a Tidewater problem, a reference to the Supreme Court's 1949 decision in National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co..45
Federal bankruptcy jurisdiction extends to all controversies
related to a bankruptcy case. There is no requirement that the
claim involved arise under federal law. In addition, the bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes allow the federal courts to hear cases
regardless of the litigants' citizenship. Although the nine categories of Article III cover a wide variety of matters, they do not
encompass cases comprised solely of state law claims between
nondiverse parties. Accordingly, Congress's grant of federal jurisdiction over such claims in bankruptcy presents a potential
Tidewater problem. 6
Several features of bankruptcy aid the Tidewater analysis.
First, because bankruptcy claims are heard in both Article III and
non-Article III courts, there is a side issue as to the extent the
Tidewater doctrine - which stems from Article III - applies to
courts created outside Article III. Second, the field of bankruptcy is subject to exclusive federal control. Accordingly, bankruptcy can serve as a means of testing the theories of "protective
jurisdiction" that certain commentators have put forth in an effort to evade the restrictions of Tidewater."7 Thus, analyzing the
43 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

Three of these categories depend on the subject

matter of the dispute, the remaining six on the citizenship of the litigants. The
terms "case" and "controversy" in Article III are essentially interchangeable, except that the former covers both civil and criminal matters, while the latter is solely
a civil matter. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937).
44 Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
Inc., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
45 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Recent commentary on the Tidewater problem includes
Thomas C. Galligan,Jr., Article III and The "Related To" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Case
Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1987).
46 This problem is in actuality illusory. In an article to appear in Volume 87 of
the NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, the author argues that bankruptcy jurisdiction actually fits within the parameters of Article III. Although the state law
claims adjudicated by a bankruptcy court may not share any factual overlap with the
bankruptcy case, other than that the debtor is a party to both, the entire controversy forms a single "case" for purposes of Article III jurisdiction. The nature of
an Article III case should be determined not only by factual overlap, but also by the
federal claim's nature.
47 Professor Galligan would sustain bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes on this ba-
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Tidewater problem from the perspective of bankruptcy could
prove especially revealing. As with other issues, confining the
analysis to a specific statutory regime forces one to deal specifically with amorphous concepts such as "overriding federal interest", that are too often used by courts and commentators in the
abstract to justify a given theory.48
3. Abstention
The doctrine, or, more accurately, doctrines of abstention
are in some respects at the core of American judicial federalism.
Over the years, the Court has established a complex web of rules
that require a federal court to abstain from hearing a case, even
when Congress has given it jurisdiction to hear that case.4 9
These rules are divided into three categories for discussion purposes. The first, commonly referred to as Pullman-° and/or
Thibodaux5 1 abstention, focuses on whether a federal court should
refuse to hear a case involving state law in order to give the states
the opportunity to rule on that issue.52 Younger 53 abstention, the
second category, is designed to prevent the federal courts from
interfering with pending state judicial or administrative proceedings. Third, Colorado River 54 abstention requires the federal
sis. See Galligan, supra note 45. But compare Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The ProtectiveJurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542 (1983); Paul E. Mishkin,
The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184-96 (1953);
Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of ProtectiveJurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 933
(1982).
48 For example, the proponents of the "protective jurisdiction" doctrine often
argue that Congress retains a strong federal interest in protecting its Article I powers. These proponents, however, never specify in detail exactly who or what is
threatening Congress's Article I powers, nor why Congress needs to violate Article
III to protect those powers. Until they identify a perceptible threat, the proponents
of the protective jurisdiction theory will lose considerable credibility.
49 An excellent summary of the principles of abstention can be found in ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 593-676 and Supp. 103-118 (1989 and Supp.
1990).
50 Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
51 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
52 Several factors might cause the federal court to want to defer to the states on
the state law issue. In Pullman, a determination of the state law issue would have
obviated the need for the federal court to rule on an issue of federal constitutional
law. In Thibodaux, on the other hand, the federal court was being called upon to
rule on a state law issue in the context of a diversity case. Finally, the Supreme
Court indicated in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and more recently
in New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989), that federal courts must sometimes defer to complex state administrative
proceedings.
53 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
54 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
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courts in certain narrow situations to refrain from hearing a case
to avoid duplicative litigation with the state courts.
As noted earlier, one of the peculiar features of bankruptcy
is that it involves the federal courts in the adjudication of many
state law claims. Because a number of these claims may be pending before some state adjudicative body when the debtor files for
relief, bankruptcy presents an excellent proving ground for various abstention theories.
These concerns are reflected in the bankruptcy laws. The
portion of the Judicial Code that governs federal district court
jurisdiction in bankruptcy contains a pair of abstention provisions. The "permissive" abstention provision allows a district
court to abstain either when it would be in the interest of justice
or for considerations of comity with state courts or for state
law.55 The "mandatory" abstention provision requires the court to
abstain when the district court would not have had jurisdiction
absent bankruptcy and the matter can be adjudicated in a timely
fashion in state court. 5 6 Although these statutes clearly do not
cover all of the concerns presented by the Court's abstention
doctrines, they do enable the federal court to bow out in cases
presenting federalist concerns.
Yet, the very concept of abstention is in some ways antithetical to the purpose of federal jurisdiction in bankruptcy. As noted
above, Congress's goal in giving the federal courts a broad bankruptcy jurisdiction was to expedite the bankruptcy process. It
(1976). In Colorado River, the Court upheld the district court's dismissal of a federal
suit after a defendant joined the United States in a state-court proceeding to determine all water rights within the river system around which the federal suit centered.
Id. at 806. The Supreme Court approved the district court's dismissal, holding that
it properly balanced the relevant factors, including the federal forum's inconvenience, the importance of avoiding piecemeal litigation, the considerable involvement of state issues and the absence of federal proceedings beyond the filing of the
complaint, before dismissing. Id. at 806-20. See also Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (upholding the balancing test articulated in Colorado River and deeming the lower court's stay of the action sufficiently analogous to the Colorado River federal court's dismissal for the Colorado
River doctrine to apply).
55 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1) (1992).
56 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1992). In addition to these provisions of the Judicial
Code, the Bankruptcy Code contains another self-styled "abstention" provision.
Section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code allows the court to dismiss a bankruptcy case if
it would best serve the interests of creditors or if there is a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding pending. Id. at § 305. Although written in terms of abstention, § 305
is not designed to deal with the types of concerns that arise in Pullman/Younger!
Colorado River abstention. Those doctrines exist primarily in order to preserve the
role of state judiciaries in United States federalism.
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would frustrate this goal to require a federal court to abstain
from hearing some of the claims out of deference to the state
courts. Balancing the federal concern of efficient administration
with the interests of the states in shaping their laws presents a
constant tension in bankruptcy; a tension that may eventually
help define the contours of abstention.
B.

Erie Concerns
1. The Applicability of Erie in Bankruptcy

A number of courts and scholars have recognized the basic
proposition that a bankruptcy court should apply state law when
adjudicating many of the claims relating to a debtor's bankruptcy
estate.57 Most of the debtor's rights and obligations will be created under state law. Because bankruptcy is primarily a process
for sorting out these rights and obligations in order to liquidate
the debtor's estate, it follows that state law should continue to
govern in bankruptcy. Changing the applicable law would frustrate the parties' expectations.
Less commonly recognized is the argument that the Erie doctrine 5 8 may actually require this result. Contrary to the tenets of
many law students (and, unfortunately, some professors), Erie is
not limited to diversity cases. The doctrine may also apply in
federal question cases. Erie requires the federal courts to employ
state law unless there is a legitimate body of federal law to the contrary. This federal law can be either statutory or court-created.
The federal courts, however, do not have an unrestrained power
to create law. The federal courts may create law only when the
Constitution or Congress delegates them the power to do so.
State law is not an issue in most federal question cases. The
entire case often turns on a federal statute that defines the rights
and obligations of the parties. The statute clearly constitutes legitimate federal law. Moreover, even though the statute may be
silent or ambiguous on some key issues, the federal court has the
authority to create a law defining those terms. A grant of jurisdiction to interpret a statute must by definition include a delegation of the power to "create" federal law interpreting the statute.
See supra note 12.
It hardly needs repeating that the Erie doctrine is not limited to the Court's
original decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Instead, the
doctrine has grown into a hydra-like creature that touches, in one way or another,
upon a wide variety of cases heard by the federal courts.
57
58
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Thus, most federal question cases will involve only issues of federal law.
In some cases, though, Congress intends for the courts to
use state law when interpreting a statute. In the non-bankruptcy
case of De Sylva v. Ballentine,5 9 for example, the Supreme Court
held that the issue of whether illegitimate children were "children" for purposes of the copyright laws was to be determined in
accordance with state law. Bankruptcy presents a similar situation. Congress did not delegate to the courts the power to create
rules of tort, contract and property to apply in bankruptcy. To
the contrary, Congress intended that the federal courts use state
law to determine the existence and scope of these basic economic
rights. Even though federal courts hear bankruptcy cases under
their federal question jurisdiction instead of their diversity jurisdiction,60 they are bound to apply state law when resolving certain issues.
2.

Applying the Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy

Acknowledging the applicability of Erie in bankruptcy, however, raises as many issues as it resolves. Although Erie applies in
federal question cases, it may not apply in the same fashion as it
does in diversity cases. As Professor John Hart Ely noted years
ago in his landmark article, 6 1 there are two potential sources of
the Erie doctrine - one narrow, the other broad. The narrow
view would base the doctrine on the Rules of Decision Act,6 2 the
statute construed by the Erie Court and the technical basis on
which the Court reversed its earlier decision in Swift v. Tyson.6 3
Under the broad view, the doctrine emanates from the Constitution. The majority opinion in Erie suggests both theories.6 4
In the typical diversity case, the source of the Erie rule is ir59 351 U.S. 570 (1956). The provision in question governed inheritance of the
copyright following the author's death. Id. at 571-72.
60 The reference to "federal question" and "diversity" jurisdiction in the text
refers to the constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts, not the acts of Congress implementing that jurisdiction. There is, of course, a separate jurisdictional
statute that pertains to the district courts in bankruptcy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(1992).
61 John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974).
62 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
63 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
64 For example, after acknowledging the error of the Swift Court in construing
the Rules of Decision Act, Justice Brandeis declared that "[i]f only a question of
statutory construction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of
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relevant. The federal court should reach the exact same result
under either theory. A federal court in a diversity case must apply state law regardless of whether it does so because Congress
says it must (the narrow view) or because the Constitution makes
it powerless to create any other law (the broad view). 6 5 Because
the case involves only state law, there will rarely be a reason for
the federal court to ignore state law in favor of a contrary court66
created federal rule.
In a federal question case, on the other hand, the source of
the rule becomes crucial. Most federal question cases are based
upon a federal statute. A federal court adjudicating that case will
therefore attempt to discern and fulfill the congressional intent
behind the statute. In cases like bankruptcy, that intent will often
be for the federal court to use state law for many of the underlying issues.
But what if a particular provision of state law undermines the
congressional intent? This problem can arise when state law departs from the norm in effect in most states. The potential for
conflict is particularly great in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code
ordinarily looks to state law to determine what the debtor owns
and whom he owes. Congress proceeded, however, from a general paradigm of ownership and debt when framing the Code. A
state law that falls outside that paradigm is at odds with the congressional intent underlying the bankruptcy laws.
Consider, for example, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), which exempts from discharge any debt based upon, inter alia, "larthe course pursued has now been made clear and compels us to do so." Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (footnote omitted).
Later opinions also suggest both theories. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, for example, suggested that the Rules of Decision Act was "merely declaratory of what
would in any event have governed the federal courts.
Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945).
Even if one accepts the premise that the basic Erie doctrine emanates from the
Constitution, it need not follow that all corollaries of that rule are constitutionally
required. For example, the rule in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. Inc., 313 U.S.
487 (1941) - that the command to follow state law extends to state choice-of-law
rules - is probably not mandated by the Constitution. See Cross, supra note 12, at
559-63.
65 Other constitutional arguments are possible. Language in the Erie opinion,
for example, suggests that the constitutional basis could be either equal protection,
Erie, 304 U.S. at 75, or a Tenth Amendment-like limitation on the powers of Congress, id. at 78. Of all these arguments, the one set out in the text is the most
plausible.
66 A case that raises a particularly strong federal interest, however, may justify
the application of federal common law. Federal common law will be discussed infra
at text accompanying notes 73-86.
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ceny." '6 7 Most states define larceny to include an element of
intent. Suppose, however, that a state criminal definition of larceny included negligent destruction of property. Under that interpretation, a debtor in that state could not obtain a discharge of a
debt arising out of property damage in an automobile accident
for which she was at fault. That result would clearly be at odds
with the purpose of § 523(a)(4), which is simply to prevent the
perpetrators of intentional property crimes from using bankruptcy
to keep the pilfered property.6 8
What does a federal court do when faced with such a conflict? The solution turns on identifying the Erie doctrine's
source. If the doctrine is constitutional, the federal court must
apply state law for the simple reason that there is no other law to
apply.6 9 Nowhere does the Bankruptcy Code define "larceny".
And under the constitutional theory, a federal court possesses no
inherent power to create such law. Moreover, there is no indication that Congress delegated to the bankruptcy courts the power
to create an independent definition.
If the doctrine is simply statutory, the matter becomes more
complicated. The court must now resolve a conflict between the
general mandate of the Rules of Decision Act and the specific
purposes of the federal statute. In all likelihood, the specific statute will carry the field. 70 Because nothing in the Rules of Decision Act indicates that the federal courts are powerless to create
rules of law that are contrary to state rules, the federal court may
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (1992).
It is interesting to note that Congress acknowledged the possibility of aberrational state law in § 523(a)(5). This provision excludes from discharge any debt to
a spouse, former spouse, or child for alimony, maintenance, or support. The mere
fact, however, that a state has labeled an obligation as alimony, maintenance or
support is not sufficient. The section goes on to provide that the debt must be "in
the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support" in order to escape discharge. 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1992). Presumably, the court is to use federal common law
to define the "nature" of an alimony, maintenance or support obligation.
69 The analysis is actually more complex in the case of a suit based upon a federal statute. In a few cases involving a complex federal statutory scheme, the
Supreme Court has found a delegation of the power to craft federal common law
rules to "fill in the gaps" in that scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973). If a federal court may create federal law on a
given subject, it need not follow state law on that subject.
70 The Rules of Decision Act contains a built-in "safety valve." The statute requires the federal court to follow state law "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide .... " 28
U.S.C. § 305 (1988). In the case of a conflict between a specific federal statute and
the Rules of Decision Act, fulfilling the purpose of the specific statute may "require" the federal court to ignore state law.
67
68
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provide its own rule to carry out Congress's intent. In so doing,
the federal court ignores the state law that created the property
interest or debt in the first place. 7 '
Bankruptcy, then, provides a means of fleshing out the Erie
doctrine and its corollaries in federal question cases. Unlike
most federal question cases, state law is frequently a factor in
bankruptcy. A particular provision of state law, however, may
not always lead to the desired result. The extent to which a federal court adjudicating what was originally a state-law right may
ignore that otherwise applicable state law presents a number of
difficult jurisprudential questions. 72 To date, however, the issue
has been discussed only sporadically by the courts and
commentators.
3.

Federal Common Law

Justice Brandeis's statement in Erie concerning the nature of
federal common law has often been misquoted. He did not reject
outright the existence of all federal common law. Justice Brandeis instead proclaimed that there was "no federal general common law." ' 7' The adjective "general" is important, for
commencing with a case decided on the same date as Erie, the
Supreme Court has consistently recognized that there is a substantial body of specific federal common law.7 "
This post-Erie federal common law is fundamentally different
from its predecessor. 75 The troubling issue is how to define the
71 The De Sylva Court recognized this possibility, and suggested in dictum that a
federal court in these circumstances would not be required to follow the aberrational state rule. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956).

72 In addition to the basic federal law/state law question posed in a classic Erie
case, the federal court may face a number of related problems. For example, once a

federal court concludes that state law governs a lawsuit, it must next resolve the

issue of which state's law to apply. This corollary issue can be especially troubling in
a suit based primarily on a federal statute. See generally Cross, supra note 12.
73 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). Justice Brandeis's statement reflected a major trend in United States jurisprudence, with implications far
beyond the narrow realm of federal jurisdiction. The Justice's theory was based on
the Holmesian notion that all law - even the common law - must ultimately derive from the sovereign. Under this view the common law is "judge-made law," not

some universal natural law that judges are charged to interpret. Since Erie, all of
the states in the United States (with the possible exception of Georgia, see John B.
Rees Jr., Choice of Law in Georgia: Time to Consider a Change?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 787

(1983)) have similarly abandoned the notion of a universal common law.
74 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938)
(apportionment of an interstate stream).

75 Prior to Erie, the federal courts could apply federal common law in most diversity cases. A federal court was required to look to state law only in "local" ac-
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categories of cases in which the federal courts may apply federal
common law. At the risk of oversimplification, the precedent
falls into two classes. 7 6 First, a federal court may create federal
common law when Congress has delegated it the power to make
law on that subject." Defining this class would not be difficult if
the Supreme Court precedent required an explicit delegation of
lawmaking authority. The Court, however, has often seen fit to
infer a delegation from a federal statute's language or purpose. 78
The second class is even more amorphous. The Court has
also recognized the existence of federal common law in cases that
involve some strong "federal interest." For example, the contractual rights and liabilities of the United States are governed by
federal law. 79 Similarly, a federal court may use a federal common law rule in order to protect a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. 8" Federal common law, however, does not apply in
all suits that may affect the federal government. 8 ' The Court has
on more than one occasion walked an extremely fine line in distinguishing the cases.
Bankruptcy provides a way to develop these theories. Under
the first, it is clear that Congress did not delegate to the federal
courts the power to create an entire regime of rules to cover all
tions, i.e., those governed by a statute or involving real estate or other immovables.
Erie, 304 U.S. at 71. Today, a federal court may do so only in certain narrow categories of cases. If the case does fall into one of these categories, however, the court
need not try to ascertain the "general" rule on the subject, but may instead craft its
own rule.
For an excellent discussion of federal common law, see Henry J. Friendly, In
Praise of Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
76 Of course, not all of the cases fit neatly into one or the other class. The
Court's 1972 decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), for example, can fit into either of the classes discussed below.
77 See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981)
(antitrust laws).
78 Probably the most extreme example of an implied delegation is Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), in which
the Court inferred that Congress had delegated to the federal courts the power to
create a common law governing labor contracts merely by granting jurisdiction
over such contracts.
79 United States v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203 (1970); National Metropolitan Bank
v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943).
The Court has applied a similar analysis in tort cases, see United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593
(1959), as well as in property cases, see United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
80 Little Lake Misere, 412 U.S. at 603-04; City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 107.
81 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
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matters arising in bankruptcy. The courts may nevertheless have
been delegated the power to create common law rules on certain
specific topics. For example, the federal courts have developed a
substantial body of law dealing with the liability of the trustee in
bankruptcy. s 2 The delegation in this case must be an implied
one, stemming from the Bankruptcy Code's detailed coverage of
the duties of the bankruptcy trustee. Other Code provisions may
also constitute a delegation of the power to create corollary
rights and duties.
The second class, i.e., matters in which there is a strong federal interest, is potentially an even more fruitful source of federal
common law in bankruptcy. There certainly is a federal interest
in bankruptcy. This interest can be found at several different
levels. First, and most generally, the federal government has an
interest in the overall process of bankruptcy. The Constitution
explicitly grants Congress the power to regulate bankruptcy. 3
Congress has exercised this power by maintaining a bankruptcy
system since the mid-1800's and by revising the system as the
economy's needs have changed. Federal laws on the subject of
bankruptcy "preempt" state laws in the broadest sense of that
term, overriding state laws regardless of whether they are consistent with federal law. 84 This general federal interest in bankruptcy, however, is unlikely to result in any significant amount of
federal common law. Congress intended for the process of bankruptcy to take place within the parameters originally established
by state law. Therefore, the existing state law rules of tort, contract, and property are the norm; not some general body of federal commercial law.
There may also, however, be a strong federal interest in individual bankruptcy cases. The most obvious example is when a
bankruptcy court adjudicates a claim by or against the federal
government. A bankruptcy court should apply federal common
law to resolve that claim to the same extent it would resolve a
claim outside bankruptcy. But there may also be other, more
82 Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee, 819 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1987); In re
Rigden, 795 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1986).
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
84 In International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929), the Supreme Court
invalidated an Arkansas law dealing with assignments for the benefit of creditors.
The Court held that the state law was invalid because it fell within Congress's Article I power to regulate bankruptcy. It is significant to note that the Court reached
this conclusion without discussing whether the state law was in any way inconsistent
with the federal bankruptcy laws. See also Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 953, 956 n.7 (1981).
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subtle situations. A number of large corporations have recently
sought protection under the bankruptcy laws. Some of these
companies have a significant impact on the United States economy, an area that the federal government regulates extensively.8 5
Others may deal directly with the United States, thereby affecting
the interest of the federal government in its military or other affairs. Any of these situations present the opportunity for the federal courts to protect the federal interest by applying federal
common law.8 6
Bankruptcy also affords courts the opportunity to resolve a
related question pertaining to federal common law. Once a court
determines that federal common law governs a particular issue, it
must then determine the content of that law. This second stage of
the process is often overlooked by the courts and commentators.8 7 It nevertheless presents some interesting considerations.
If a court is empowered to create federal common law because of
the federal interest in a case, does it automatically follow that the
court-created rule must further that federal interest? Is the federal court bound by other federal common law precedent? For
the concept of federal common law to remain credible as a body
of law, as opposed to an ad hoc way for a court to reach the desired result in a given case, these issues must be resolved. Perhaps bankruptcy provides a forum for the federal courts to
address them.
Overall, bankruptcy presents a wealth of Erie issues. Virtually everyone acknowledges that most of the basic rights and liabilities involved in bankruptcy are creatures of state law. The
bankruptcy process, however, presents these issues in a distinctly
federal light. The federal court must resolve these state law issues as part of the overall federal process of restructuring the
debtor-creditor relationship. This mix of federal and state concerns means that there will always be a tension between the logi85 The increasing numbers of bankruptcies among the airlines - and the resulting turmoil in that industry - come immediately to mind.
86 See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Boyle involved a wrongful death suit brought by the family of a soldier killed in a helicopter
crash against the manufacturer of the helicopter. The Court held that the potential
effect of any judgment on the military contracting process was enough to invoke
federal common law. Id. at 511-12.
87 The Boyle decision discussed in the prior note again serves as an example.
The majority opinion in Boyle focuses primarily on the issue of whether federal
common law governs the claim. After deciding that federal common law does govern, the majority then seems to assume that the federal common law rule would
protect the contractor.
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cal tendency to honor the state law origins of the claims and the
urge to replace state law with a rule that better suits the special
needs of bankruptcy.
C.

Right to a Juy Trial

The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution preserves to
litigants the right to a jury as it existed at common law in 1791.88
The Supreme Court has tenaciously guarded this right, allowing
juries in cases involving both legal and equitable claims8 9 for actions that did not exist in 1791,90 and even for actions that in
1791 would have been deemed purely equitable. 9 '
Yet the constitutional right is not absolute, even in actions
seeking legal relief. In today's bureaucratic society, traditional
courts do not have a monopoly on adjudicating people's rights.
Congress has also assigned significant adjudicatory powers to
various agencies and boards. Many valuable claims, such as the
right to a broadcasting license, registration of a trademark or the
imposition of fines for violation of an agency's regulations will be
heard, at least initially, by a body other than an Article III court.
Assuming that agency adjudication is valid under the Northern Pipeline rationale discussed above,9 2 the use of that agency
also raises jury trial issues. Requiring an agency to use ajury will
often impede the efficient operation of the agency. The Supreme
Court has recognized this consequence and has held that the Seventh Amendment guaranty does not always apply to agencies.9"
This holding does not mean, however, that Congress can render
the Seventh Amendment a nullity simply by assigning matters to
88 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Because the amendment explicitly applies only to
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds twenty dollars, it does not fully
preserve the common-law right.
Moreover, the Seventh Amendment is one of the few provisions of the Bill of
Rights that has not been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U.S. 90 (1875). It therefore applies only to actions in federal court.
89 Beacon Theatres Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
90 Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558
(1990); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412 (1987).
91 Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (shareholder's derivative action seeking damages is entitled to a jury, even though such an action originated in the
courts of equity); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (suit for injunctions and an accounting; accounting "recharacterized" as a legal claim).
92 See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
93 Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
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agencies. In addition to the Northern Pipeline problems with such
a scheme, the Court has held that Congress may provide for
agency adjudication without a jury only when it creates certain
"public rights." 9' 4
1. Jury Trials for Claims Adjudicated as a Part of
Bankruptcy Case
The Bankruptcy Courts are, of course, a familiar example of
Congress's penchant for using specialized adjudicatory bodies.
It should therefore not be surprising that two of the leading
Supreme Court cases construing this public rights exception
come from the field of bankruptcy. In 1989, the Court ruled in
Granfinanciera,S.A. v. Nordberg95 that Congress could not deprive

the parties of a jury trial merely by assigning the claim in question to a Bankruptcy Court. One year later, the Court in

Langenkamp v. Culp9 6 distinguished Granfinanciera in denying a

trustee's request for a jury trial in a similar proceeding.
It is worthwhile to explore these cases in some depth for the
insight they offer not only on the jury trial issue, but also on the
overall process of bankruptcy. Unlike many of the cases heard in
the Bankruptcy Courts, Granfinancieraand Langenkamp dealt with

claims based on a federal statute. Granfinancierainvolved a claim
to recover a fraudulent transfer of the debtor's assets prior to
bankruptcy.97 The Langenkamp case involved an alleged preferential transfer.98 The party seeking to recover the transfer in both
cases was the trustee in bankruptcy, a federal official. The cases
could therefore fall outside the Seventh Amendment on two bases: the claim to recover the money was not an action at law and
it was a public right adjudicated before an adjudicatory body
other than an Article III court.
The Court in Granfinanciera rejected both of these arguments. Based upon the test that it has adopted for evaluating
statutory claims, 99 the Court first held that the claim for the re94 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Atlas Roofing Co., Inc.
v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
The analysis is very similar to a portion of the Northern Pipeline analysis concerning when Congress may establish independent non-Article III tribunals to hear
cases. In both situations, the core concern is whether the claim at bar involves
"public rights." See supra note 39.
95 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
96 111 S.Ct. 330 (1990).
97 Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 36.
98 Langenkamp, 111 S.Ct. at 330-31.
99 In Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court held that a federal
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covery of a fraudulent transfer was "analogous" to an action that
existed at common law. Therefore, in order to prevent Congress
from escaping the mandate of the Seventh Amendment simply by
codifying all common law actions, the Court determined that the
action would be treated as an action at law. 10 0
The Court then rejected the assertion that the claim involved
a "public right." The Granfinanciera Court acknowledged that
bankruptcy did involve an important public right; namely, the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship. The fraudulent
conveyance claim at issue in Granfinanciera was in the Court's
opinion not a central part of this restructuring. The claim was
brought only to "augment" the bankruptcy estate, not to determine a creditor's share of that estate.' 0 ' As such, neither of the
parties was entitled to a jury to hear that claim.
At first glance, Langenkamp appears indistinguishable from
Granfinanciera. The Langenkamp Court nevertheless distinguished

the two cases by noting that the creditor in Langenkamp had filed a
proof of claim against the estate. Seizing upon a suggestion in
the Granfinanciera opinion, 10 2 the Langenkamp Court held that by
filing the proof of claim, the creditor had consented to trial without a jury in the bankruptcy forum.' 0 3 Because most creditors
file proofs of claim, one may infer from Langenkamp that a bankruptcyjudge need not empanel ajury in the vast majority of proceedings that arise in a typical bankruptcy case.'0 4
2. The Ability of a Bankruptcy Court to Provide a Jury
Trial
The Court's holding in Granfinanciera raises another issue
that its opinion unfortunately does not address. The Court recourt faced with a request for a jury for a claim based upon a statute should consider both the nature of the action and the remedy being sought. The Court's more
recent opinions have treated the second part of the analysis - the nature of the
remedy - as virtually controlling. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local No.
391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990).
100 Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 40.
101 This argument is admittedly open to criticism. After all, adding assets to the
estate increases the value of the estate, which directly affects the amount eventually
distributed to every unsecured creditor.
102 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 40.
103 This reasoning allowed the Court to uphold Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323
(1966), which held that ajury trial was not required in a case seeking to recover a
preferential transfer.
104 The reasoning employed by the Court in Langenkamp also raises interesting
issues concerning the scope and nature of consent, which will be discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 111-122.
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manded the case to the Bankruptcy Court with instructions to
provide a jury trial on the fraudulent transfer claim. It is not
clear, however, that a non-Article III court can constitutionally
preside over a jury trial. Some have suggested that the power to
provide a jury is an inherent part of the Article IIIjudicial power,
and therefore beyond the powers that Congress may vest in the
05
Bankruptcy Courts. 1

Any analysis of this issue, of course, must proceed along
much the same lines as the Northern Pipeline debate discussed
above."0 6 The core concern is again the power of Congress to
assign the functions of Article III courts to non-Article III courts.
But the jury trial issue presents problems not present in other
cases of this genre. One way for Congress to employ non-Article
III courts is to use them as an "adjunct" to an Article III court;
i.e., a lower tribunal that helps expedite the work of the Article III
court. 10

7

When used in this fashion, a non-Article III court may

hear matters that fall within the judicial power of the constitutional courts.' 018 The revisions to the Judicial Code, enacted in
the wake of Northern Pipeline, essentially treat the Bankruptcy
Court as a hybrid between a true adjunct and an independent
court. 0 9
Certain problems arise in allowing the Bankruptcy Court to
use a jury in cases where it sits as an adjunct. Findings of an
adjunct court, although in practice given considerable weight, are
in theory subject to de novo review by an Article III court." 0 If
those findings come from a jury, however, they must be accorded
greater deference, in order to give some meaning to the constitu105 Compare In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990) (bankruptcy
judge may conduct jury trial) with In re United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A.,
901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990) (non-Article III bankruptcy judge possesses no
power to preside over a jury trial).
106 See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
107 Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 77-84
(1982).

108 Id.

109 The bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes divide bankruptcy-related matters into
"core" and "non-core" proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1992). With respect to
core matters (and non-core matters for which the parties agree to Bankruptcy
Court adjudication), the Bankruptcy Court acts as an independent court. For other
non-core matters, however, the Bankruptcy Court's role is essentially that of an
adjunct to the district court. In this latter category of cases, the Bankruptcy Court
merely suggests findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court. Id. at
(c)(1).
110 The bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes recognize this principle, providing that
the findings of a Bankruptcy Court on non-core matters are to be reviewed de novo
by the district court. Id.
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tional right to a jury trial. Accordingly, there is a tension between the practical requirements for a workable, expeditious
bankruptcy system and the dictates of both Northern Pipeline and
the Seventh Amendment.
Bankruptcy, then, can provide useful insight into the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Congress has created a
broad statutory scheme that relies for its success on the speedy
and efficient administration of estates. Requiring a jury hinders
this process. Bankruptcy therefore offers a working example of
the sorts of tensions that arise when quasi-administrative tribunals such as the Bankruptcy Court attempt to make use ofjuries.
D.

The Limits of Consent and Waiver

Consent, and its closely-related cousin waiver, are powerful
tools in the law. Both stem from the basic axiom that an individual is entitled to a certain level of self-determination, regardless
of whether the particular choices made by the individual seem to
be in her best interests. That axiom applies even when a person
elects to give up some valuable right. Courts have accordingly
relied upon both consent and waiver in denying individuals a
wide variety of procedural and substantive rights."' Finding
consent or waiver also serves a related, more practical purpose.
It promotes judicial efficiency by relieving courts of the burden
of adjudicating a matter.
But consent and waiver have their limits. First, there are issues of fairness. If taken to the extreme, courts could use consent and waiver to deprive people of a whole array of rights. The
law has therefore established certain checks to prevent misuse of
the doctrines. Courts have traditionally drawn a line between
consent or waiver that is knowing and voluntary, and "constructive" consent or waiver implied from the surrounding circumstances. A court will not imply either consent or waiver unless it
12
is fair under the circumstances to do so."
Second, certain rights may not be relinquished through con111 National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (a person may
waive the right to receive service of process); D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co.,
405 U.S. 174 (1972) (a person may consent to the entry ofjudgment, even if he was
never notified of the action); Moore v. United States, 196 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1952)
(a party can waive constitutional right to a jury trial by failing to file a timely
demand).
112 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Schutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985), a class action
case, where the Court held that by failing to execute and return an "opt-out" form,
a member of the class consented to the court's adjudication of that member's claim.
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sent or waiver. For the purposes of this Article, the most important is the right to seek dismissal of an action for want of subjectmatter jurisdiction in the adjudicating tribunal. A court that does
not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a dispute may not acquire it by the consent of the parties. Similarly, a party cannot
waive subject-matter jurisdiction through action or inaction. Unlike other defenses, subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by
any party - including the party who originally invoked the jurisdiction of the court - at any stage of the litigation, including
appeals. Courts may even raise the issue of lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on their own initiative."'
Bankruptcy is a useful way to test these two limits on consent
and waiver, primarily because elements of the bankruptcy process arguably contradict both. Consider first the proposition that
the parties to a suit may not establish subject-matter jurisdiction
by consent or waiver. Certain parts of the subject-matter jurisdiction provisions in bankruptcy rely quite heavily on consent.
The most prominent example (and one that should already be
familiar) is the provision establishing the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. 1 4 Ordinarily, a Bankruptcy Court that is hearing a
"non-core" matter acts merely as an adjunct, i.e., its findings are
subject to de novo review by an Article III court." 15 If the parties
and the district court agree to adjudication in the Bankruptcy
Court, however, the Bankruptcy Court's powers are augmented.
With such consent, the findings of the Bankruptcy Court are subject to the normal levels of appellate deference." 6 It is not entirely clear how the consent of either the parties or the district
court is relevant. If we are to believe Northern Pipeline," 7 it is Article III of the Constitution that prevents the non-Article III Bankruptcy Court from exercising independent judicial power over
113 See Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), in which the
Supreme Court raised the issue sua sponte, even though neither the parties nor the
lower courts had discussed any jurisdictional problems. FED. R. CIV. PROC.
12(h)(3) similarly allows the federal district courts to raise the jurisdictional issue at
any time.
114 28 U.S.C. § 157 (1992).
115 Id. at 157(c)(1). Generally, the reviewing Article III court will be the district
court for the same district. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1992). Some circuits, however,
have established a bankruptcy appellate panel for all cases in that circuit. Id. at (b).
For the distinction between "core" and "non-core" matters, see supra note 34.
116 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1992). The district court must also consent to refer the
matter to the bankruptcy court for adjudication. Id.
117 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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the case. Ordinarily, this sort of constitutional bar is not subject
to waiver by the parties or the courts.
Different applications of consent and waiver in bankruptcy
test the other limit on those doctrines, i.e., the notion of fairness.
The most common illustration of this problem is the creditor
who files a proof of claim with the Bankruptcy Court. By filing
that short form, the creditor will be deemed to have consented to
a number of things. First, the creditor has consented to have his
claim heard in a Bankruptcy Court in a given district. The creditor might have preferred to prosecute his claim in some other
court, state or federal - perhaps even halfway across the country. l"' Outside of bankruptcy, it is the creditor - the one who
seeks relief from the courts - who has the ability to select the
court. Second, the bankruptcy creditor will not be able to avail
himself of certain procedural rights that might otherwise exist.
As discussed above, for example, the Supreme Court's recent
Langenkamp decision held that a creditor who files a proof of
claim waives his constitutional right to a jury trial in actions
brought against him by the trustee.11 9
Yet something about this "consent" is troubling. Filing a
proof of claim in a bankruptcy case is not the calculated choice
that is typically involved in a legal consent. In reality, the creditor has no other option. If he does not file the proof of claim, he
will receive nothing from the bankruptcy distribution.1 2 0 Regardless of whether he receives anything, his debt is discharged.' 2 ' The creditor is precluded from pursuing an
independent action against the debtor either before or after the
discharge.' 2 2 Therefore, the creditor must either play the bankruptcy game or lose his claim. It is troubling to call the creditor's
118 The venue statutes that pertain to bankruptcy provide that most claims are to
be heard in the district where the original bankruptcy petition was filed. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1409 (1992).
The consent involved in this situation is different than that discussed in the
prior paragraph. The Bankruptcy Court almost certainly has jurisdiction over the
creditor's claim. Filing the proof of claim accordingly does not establish the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court. Rather, this situation involves a consent as to which
court will hear the claim.
"19 Langenkamp v. Culp, 111 S. Ct. 330 (1990).
120 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a)(2) & (3) (1988) provide that unsecured creditors will take
part in the distribution only if they have filed proofs of claim.
121 Except for certain enumerated obligations, a bankruptcy discharge affects all
of the debtor's debts, regardless of whether the creditor filed a proof of claim. 11
U.S.C. § 727(b) (1988).
122 11 U.S.C. §§ 362 and 524(a) (1979), respectively, prohibit the creditor from
attempting to recover on the debt both during and after the bankruptcy case.

19931

VIEWING FEDERAL JURISDICTION

559

filing of the proof of claim a "consent," with all the consequences
that may attach.
Accordingly, bankruptcy provides a means of exploring the
extent to which consent can change the ground rules of federal
jurisdiction. Consent can be quite important in bankruptcy. It
certainly helps the system run more efficiently; for example, consent obviates the need for an additional hearing on certain administrative matters. Yet, consent must have its limits. Many
features of the United States federal court system represent a
delicate balance among several competing interests. Courts have
traditionally refused to allow the litigants' whims to upset this
balance. The only reason to reject this basic principle in bankruptcy is if something about bankruptcy makes the balance come
out differently, or if the need for efficient resolution of bankruptcy cases overrides the balance.
CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this Article is to stimulate further
discussion, not to provide answers. Many scholars in the area of
federal jurisdiction feel constrained to argue in the abstract. Discussion frequently revolves around hypothetical titanic struggles
between Congress, the state, and the federal courts. This Article
attempts to show that bankruptcy actually presents some of these
issues in real life. Many of the hypothetical issues posed by
scholars have actually been fought, in a more limited and perhaps
more mundane fashion, in bankruptcy.
Most great political battles, of course, are fought over political matters - issues on which many people hold strong opinions. Bankruptcy probably does not generate the same
widespread fervor as civil rights or religious freedom. Yet, it is
just this absence of deep-seated emotion that makes bankruptcy
such a useful analytical tool. Arguing issues of federal jurisdiction in the context of politically charged issues may cause one to
lose perspective. Often, the end is just as important than the
means to that end. It is therefore all too tempting to devise the
means so as to reach that end. In bankruptcy, however, the ends
are not preordained. Because of this relative absence of political
overtones, bankruptcy provides a clear looking glass into the morass called federal jurisdiction.

